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Model laws play an extremely important role in the history of “home 
rule” for local governments in the United States. So it is of no small 
moment that the National League of Cities (NLC) proposed a new 
Model Constitutional Home Rule Article (the Model Article) last 
February.  
 
Unfortunately, the Model Article is severely flawed. Rather than 
systematically addressing and responding to the various contemporary 
problems of local governance, it is laser-focused on a single issue: the 
spate of preemptive laws passed by politically-conservative state 
legislatures in recent years to override policies adopted by politically-
liberal cities. To address these preemptive laws, the NLC suggests the 
adoption of a suite of provisions that would radically increase and 
protect the powers of local governments. But while the Model Article 
suggests very substantial expansions of local authority, it does not 
balance this with any new limits, even in areas where local governments 
systematically create huge societal costs. The NLC barely mentions 
many of the most important problems in contemporary local 
governance, including zoning and the housing crisis, police brutality, 
subsidies for firm location, unrepresentative local elections, 
segregation, and underfunded public employee pension programs. 
Further, the Model Article does not propose any substantive 
requirements that would address these issues and would substantially 
frustrate state legislative efforts aimed at limiting socially-costly local 
policies in these areas. It does not address questions of incorporation 
or annexation, granting new powers to our existing set of local 
governments, despite the problems their boundaries create for regional 
economic output, segregation, and inequality. The NLC report also 
implicitly takes a strong ideological position about what types of 
policies local governments can and should adopt, something that its 
putatively neutral rhetoric about the value of localism and laboratories 
of democracy does not support.  
 
For the NLC, with great new powers come absolutely no new 
responsibility or limits. The Model Article would allow and encourage 
local governments to exclude outsiders and create regulatory confusion 
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inside metropolitan areas. It would generate a substantial amount of 
harm to metropolitan economies and inequality in the name of allowing 
even small home rule local governments to choose their own policies 
without interference from outsiders. No state should adopt the NLC’s 
recommendation.  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR NIMBYS ..................... 884 
II. WHAT DOES THE NLC’S MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL HOME RULE 
ARTICLE ACTUALLY CONTAIN? ................................................... 890 
A. Local Authority ...................................................................... 891 
B. Presumption Against Preemption .......................................... 891 
C. Local Democratic Self-Government ....................................... 894 
D. State Support for Local Democracy ....................................... 894 
III: THE POLITICAL FAILURE OF THE NLC REPORT ............................... 896 
IV. THE POLICY FAILURES OF THE NLC REPORT .................................. 898 
A. Zoning and Exclusion ............................................................ 899 
B. Local Democracy ................................................................... 910 
C. Local Fiscal Powers ............................................................... 913 
D. Incorporation, Annexation and Secession ............................. 919 
V. CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF IMAGINATION IN THE NLC  
 REPORT ........................................................................................ 921 
I. INTRODUCTION:  
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FOR NIMBYS 
Home rule comes in waves. In the twentieth century, there were two such 
waves, one in the Progressive Era and another following a model state 
constitutional amendment proposed by the American Municipal Association 
(AMA) in the 1950s.1 So, it is a big deal that the National League of Cities (the 
NLC, the successor organization to the AMA) just proposed a new Model 
Constitutional Home Rule Article (Model Article) for states to adopt.2  
The NLC “Principles of Home Rule for the 21st Century” report (the Report) 
contains an ambitious wish list for local governments seeking more power and 
less oversight from state governments.3 It proposes a Model Article that contains 
 
 1 NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, PRINCIPLES OF HOME RULE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 11–12 
(2020), https://www.nlc.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/Home%20Rule%20Principles%20 
ReportWEB-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GVL-T8Y3] [hereinafter PRINCIPLES]; see also LYNN 
A. BAKER, CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, & DAVID SCHLEICHER, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 317–20 (5th ed. 2015).  
 2 PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 21. 
 3 See id. at 8 (describing four “interrelated propositions” to “foster” the conversations 
surrounding the relationship between state and local governments). 
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the same type of broad delegation of authority to local governments that marked 
the AMA’s 1950s-era home rule proposal.4 But rather than pairing that with a 
relatively easy means for state legislatures to preempt local decisions, as the 
1950s model amendment did, the Report’s Model Article instead marries its 
substantial delegation of authority with a huge number of other protections for 
local authority.5 These include a “presumption against preemption,” requiring 
preemptive state laws to be: (a) expressly preemptive, (b) necessary to serve a 
substantial state interest, (c) narrowly tailored to that interest, and (d) pursuant 
to a “general” state law.6 The Model Article would also remove any 
constitutional restrictions on local taxing authority and on the power of local 
governments to pass “private laws,” like contract or tort laws.7 It also 
recommends that state constitutions provide local governments with almost full 
autonomy to structure local elections and local governmental form, and would 
bar many conditions on state aid and unfunded mandates.8 And it would provide 
affirmative constitutional rights for residents of local governments, including a 
barely-described but potentially radical requirement that the state provide to all 
local governments “adequate” money to provide local services.9 
The Report is a creative and important effort, and the Model Article contains 
some attractive elements. Its authors are serious scholars.10 But the Report is 
fatally flawed.11 The Model Article should not be adopted anywhere. 
 
 4 See id. at 20. 
 5 See id. at 21. 
 6 See id. at 26. Notably, “general” here means something much broader than it does 
under most state constitutional bans on “special legislation.” See id.; infra text accompanying 
note 49.  
 7 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 24–25. 
 8 Id. at 25, 36–37. 
 9 Id. at 37. 
 10 The working group that produced the Report was led by Nestor Davidson, and 
included Richard Briffault, Paul Diller, Sarah Fox, Laurie Reynolds, Erin Adele Scharff, 
Richard Schragger, and Rick Su. Id. at 2.  
 11 It should be noted that this response was written before both the COVID-19 crisis 
that swept the nation and world and before the protests following the killing of George Floyd. 
Rather than rewrite it in the middle of the pandemic, the economic crisis that followed, and 
the rapidly changing politics of policing, I will keep the arguments as they were with a few 
minor exceptions in the introduction and elsewhere where absolutely necessary. The 
uncertainty that exists now about what the future holds means that an effort to shape the text 
to the news of the moment would be folly. However, based on what we know now, the 
argument in this piece is far stronger than it was originally. If a central problem facing the 
country is a need for coordinated responses to a virus that pays no attention to jurisdictional 
boundaries, the case for local variation is weaker. The problems of interlocal inequality and 
segregation are more severe in a world where a pandemic and a recession severely tax local 
fiscal capacity in poor jurisdictions. Some local governments were in favor of more 
aggressive responses than the states in which they sit. See, e.g., Meredith Deliso, From 
Reopenings to Masks, How Georgia Gov. Kemp Has Handled the Coronavirus Pandemic, 
ABC NEWS (July 21, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/reopenings-masks-georgia-gov-
kemp-handled-coronavirus-pandemic/story?id=71882007 [https://perma.cc/BSV5-39Z6] 
(describing how the city of Atlanta required stricter mask-wearing adherence than its parent 
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Why? The Report refuses to respond to, or even consider, the numerous 
reasons for skepticism about local authority. As a result, it is unbalanced, seeing 
harm in state oversight but no benefits, and all local authority as good. And even 
though it suggests substantial constitutional changes, the Report includes no 
proposals to address the shape, size, or makeup of local governments, granting 
substantial new powers to our existing set of local governments even when the 
boundaries and politics of those local governments generate problems of 
inequality, slow growth, and segregation. 
Rather than taking a broad look at the issues facing local governments, the 
Report understands the problem to which it is responding to be a relatively 
narrow one: the rash of preemptive state laws, largely passed by Republican 
state legislatures to overcome liberal social policies passed by Democratic-run 
cities, over the last decade or so.12 In its monomania to address this issue, the 
Report either barely discusses or fails to even mention problems for which local 
governments bear substantial responsibility, from the housing crisis to police 
brutality to underfunded public pension programs. While the Model Article 
suggests very substantial expansions of local authority, it does not balance this 
with any new limits, even in areas where local governments have been clearly 
creating huge societal costs.13 Nor does it seek to limit which types of local 
governments should be given these vast new powers or to encourage municipal 
consolidation, allowing the many home rule local governments found in most 
metropolitan areas to use these powers to exclude or create substantial 
regulatory confusion.14 It does not seek to tailor local authority to specific policy 
 
state of Georgia). Some were in favor of weaker responses. See, e.g., Jake Sheridan, ‘I Don’t 
Believe It’: Huntington Beach a Symbol of Mask Resistance as Doubters Abound, L.A. TIMES 
(July 22, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-07-22/doubts-about-dange 
rs-of-covid-19-linger-in-huntington-beach [https://perma.cc/QD9N-2R3T] (describing how 
Huntington Beach, California adopted a less mask-stringent stance and culture than its parent 
state). But a problem like the COVID-19 pandemic calls for regional solutions, not locally-
tailored ones. Also, the NLC Report claims it is bringing rules governing local authority in 
the twenty-first century but does not even mention the problems of police brutality and abuse 
and how its proposals would implicate those issues. I think it is pretty clear it did not have 
its finger on the pulse of what truly matters in twenty-first century American cities.  
 12 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 16–17. 
 13 For the most part, the proposal allows as much–or more–local authority in every 
dimension than every state. It does not give local government hard imperio in imperium style 
immunity from state override, instead relying on a very powerful presumption against 
preemption. See infra text accompanying notes 37–49. Other than that, there is only one 
example where the Model Article proposes less local authority than exists in any state. 
Colorado allows local governments some power to engage in eminent domain outside of 
their boundaries through home rule authority. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 49 (describing 
Colorado’s extraterritorial eminent domain rules). The Model Article would only allow local 
governments to exercise their authority extraterritorially with state legislative authorization. 
See id.  
 14 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 5 (describing how the Report intends to encompass 
the empowerment of “cities, towns[,] and villages” in light of perceived excessive limits on 
their power to “respond to local policy demands”). 
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areas, finding no policy areas at all in which the presumption in favor of local 
authority should focus in the opposite direction, even those most likely to create 
interlocal externalities. The Model Article would also clearly complicate state 
legislative efforts aimed at limiting socially-costly local policies in these areas. 
Further, the Report takes a narrow partisan tack, loading up its diagnosis and 
Model Article provisions in a way likely to produce liberal or left outcomes and 
more regulation, while dressing it up in neutral rhetoric about devolution and 
localism.15 
Here are some examples of the problems: 
Over the last forty or so years, it has become increasingly clear that many 
local governments—both suburbs and big cities—aggressively exclude 
outsiders through excessive zoning restrictions and other land use policies.16 
These policies have reduced national economic growth by making it harder for 
workers to move to hot job markets, increasing economic inequality, 
encouraging racial segregation, and generating sprawl.17 The Model Article 
does not address this problem and would clearly frustrate the many state efforts 
at reform we have seen in recent years.18 California’s Housing Accountability 
Act and Regional Housing Needs Allocation process, Oregon’s multifamily 
zoning requirements, “anti-snob zoning” laws in Massachusetts and 
Connecticut, the Minnesota replanning requirements that led to Minneapolis’s 
 
 15 See id. at 17, 53 (describing how typically “liberal” policies—such as gun control, 
minimum wage increases, and gay rights—enacted by local governments have been often 
subject to state preemption). 
 16 See William A. Fischel, The Rise of the Homevoters: How the Growth Machine Was 
Subverted by OPEC and Earth Day, in EVIDENCE AND INNOVATION IN HOUSING LAW AND 




(arguing that the rise of environmentalism and the effect hyperinflation had on beliefs about 
whether houses were an investment caused increased zoning regulations in the 1970s and 
1980s); David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670, 1692, 1704–17 (2013) 
[hereinafter Schleicher, City Unplanning] (describing increased intensity of the use of zoning 
to exclude in the past forty years).  
 17 See JESSICA TROUNSTINE, SEGREGATION BY DESIGN: LOCAL POLITICS AND 
INEQUALITY IN AMERICAN CITIES 73 (2018) (describing link between zoning and housing 
segregation); Chang-Tai Hsieh & Enrico Moretti, Housing Constraints and Spatial 
Misallocation, 11 AM. ECON. J.: MACROECONOMICS, Apr. 2019, at 1, 1–3, https://pubs. 
aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/mac.20170388 [https://perma.cc/72CT-FMVY] (estimating 
lost economic output due to zoning regimes in restrictive regions); David Schleicher, Stuck! 
The Law and Economics of Residential Stagnation, 127 YALE L.J. 78, 81–83 (2017) 
[hereinafter Schleicher, Stuck] (reviewing literature on the economic and social costs of 
zoning restrictions). See generally Peter Ganong & Daniel W. Shoag, Why Has Regional 
Income Convergence in the U.S Declined?, 102 J. URB. ECON. 76 (2017) (describing how 
zoning regimes have biased migration patterns away from rich restrictive regions and states). 
 18 To be fair, the Report does offer two short paragraphs mentioning the problem. See 
PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 19, 49–50. See infra text accompanying notes 105 and 125 for 
a discussion of this brief discussion in the Report.  
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successful recent zoning liberalization, and many others would all be imperiled, 
as would proposed zoning reforms in California, Nebraska, Maryland and 
Virginia, among other places.19  
A huge amount of research has highlighted problems in representation in 
local elections and participation.20 Voters know little about local government 
and vote in ways entirely determined by national party preference, particularly 
in local legislative elections.21 Or, they do not show up at all; turnout in local 
elections and participation in local civic affairs is often low and 
unrepresentative, leading to greater power for residents who do participate—a 
group that is richer, whiter, and more likely to own homes than the general 
population.22 The Report does not mention these problems, holding out the 
outcomes of local elections as an uncomplicated representation of local 
preferences.23 And because it gives local governments almost free rein to 
organize the structures of their own electoral and governmental forms, the 
Model Article would allow insiders to impose rules that would continue or 
worsen this inequality in representation.24 While state elections have similar 
problems, a new model constitutional amendment could have included any 
number of substantive provisions to encourage local democracy to work better. 
Before substantial new authority is devolved, it would make sense to consider 
ways to improve local democracy. 
Cities have offered huge giveaways to attract businesses in ways that are 
almost certainly bad for society as a whole (think Amazon’s HQ2 or giveaways 
for sports stadia).25 The Model Article would make it difficult and perhaps 
nearly impossible for states to police such subsidies.26 
Written only a few years after the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement 
(and just before the protests over the killing of George Floyd), police brutality 
 
 19 See infra text accompanying notes 119–27.  
 20 See infra text accompanying notes 169–94.  
 21 See Christopher S. Elmendorf & David Schleicher, Informing Consent: Voter 
Ignorance, Political Parties, and Election Law, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 397, 404–05. 
 22 See Zoltan L. Hajnal & Paul G. Lewis, Municipal Institutions and Voter Turnout in 
Local Elections, 38 URB. AFF. REV. 645, 655–57, 665 (2003). 
 23 “At the heart of the concept of local democratic self-government is the accountability 
of local officials to the local community that results from local popular election of local 
lawmakers.” PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 62. 
 24 See id. at 36. 
 25 See DANIEL J. WILSON, FRBSF ECONOMIC LETTER 2015–06, COMPETING FOR JOBS: 
LOCAL TAXES AND INCENTIVES 1, 3 (2015), https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/files/ 
el2015-06.pdf [https://perma.cc/H39K-L5EY]; Robert S. Chirinko & Daniel J. Wilson, State 
Investment Tax Incentives: A Zero-Sum Game?, 92 J. PUB. ECON 2362, 2362 (2008) (finding, 
generally, that investment tax incentives are typically a “zero-sum game” resulting in 
negligible capital formation). For discussion about sports stadia and Amazon’s HQ2, see 
infra notes 208–09.  
 26 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 42–43. 
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doesn’t merit a single mention in the Report.27 The Report does criticize 
excessive use of criminal fines by local governments, as we saw in Ferguson, 
Missouri, acknowledging that such fines are often imposed on nonresidents or 
populations with less power in local politics.28 But the Model Article proposes 
substantial expansions of, and no limits on, this power.29 Again and again, the 
Report barely acknowledges any systematic problems with local authority and 
proposes reforms that would make it very hard for states to address these 
problems. Further, it does not propose any constitutional limits on local policing 
authority or power, which it clearly could have done. This would have been a 
limit on local authority, and so the Model Article does not go there.  
Further, the Report does not propose any constitutional limits that would 
make increased local power more palatable. For instance, the Model Article 
does not contain any limits on local fragmentation. Local government scholars 
have long understood that powers and boundaries are the two major questions 
in the field.30 But the Report explicitly avoids any policy recommendations 
about policies around changing local governmental boundaries. Given what else 
is in the Model Article, adopting it would mean granting a vast array of powers 
to the many relatively small local governments in metropolitan regions, 
allowing these governments to use their powers to exclude, increasing inequality 
and segregation.31 It would also increase patchwork policymaking at a time 
when region, rather than town, defines much of our economic and social life.32  
The Model Article does not propose any limits on local fiscal authority, 
even honest accounting rules, despite suggesting huge new funds being sent 
their way and prevalent concerns about accounting and budgeting practices 
surrounding many local governments’ public employee pension systems.33  
I am not pointing out a few minor omissions. These issues have been the 
most important issues in local governance (or at least were, in the period before 
the COVID-19 crisis, which came as this paper went into its editing process).34 
A proposal to modify local governmental authority in 2020 that has nothing to 
say about the housing crisis, police brutality, public subsidies for private firms, 
and the pension crisis is problematic, to say the very least.  
 
 27 To be fair, the Report was written before the George Floyd killing and the following 
protests. I suspect, had it been written in May 2020, it would have looked a bit different.  
 28 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 45, 47–48. 
 29 See id. at 42–44. 
 30 See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 351, 374, 422, 429 (1990) (arguing that boundaries, tax-hoarding, and 
exclusion—more than varying powers—are the central problems facing our system of local 
governance). 
 31 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 34–37. 
 32 See generally Laurie Reynolds, Intergovernmental Cooperation, Metropolitan 
Equity, and the New Regionalism, 78 WASH. L. REV. 93 (2003). 
 33 See, e.g., Schleicher, Stuck, supra note 17, at 141 (describing the power of pensioners 
in Detroit local government). 
 34 See supra text accompanying note 11. 
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A review like this one cannot propose its own set of rules on preemption 
and local power. But any such effort to do so—like the Report—should make at 
least some effort to explain how it would improve governance in the policy areas 
that have dominated local political life in recent years. 
With the exception of the vague but potentially radical requirement that the 
state legislature provide adequate revenue to all local governments, this is 
constitutional law for coastal Not in My Backyard (NIMBY) homeowners. The 
Report embraces the powers of local government to pass more regulations but 
does nothing to stop them from using those regulations to exclude and further 
segregation. It assumes local politics represent local preferences, something that 
is not true for many—particularly those who do not own homes.35 The Report 
will find supporters among the kind of people who put up two lawn signs in 
front of their multimillion dollar homes, one that says “Immigrants Welcome,” 
while the other opposes an affordable housing project nearby.36 For the rest of 
us, there is less to like. 
One should not take this criticism as an unalloyed endorsement of state 
authority. State democracy is flawed as well. Many state legislatures have gone 
far further to restrict local authority than is wise. A constitutional reform that 
limits and shapes the way courts engage in their preemption analysis is 
warranted to some degree. Some parts of the Model Article, including some new 
and stronger limits on preemption, would be attractive had they been combined 
with efforts to reduce local exclusion and fragmentation, and increase local 
governmental responsiveness and accountability. 
As it stands, though, the Model Article is too flawed for anyone to consider 
adopting.  
II. WHAT DOES THE NLC’S MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL HOME RULE 
ARTICLE ACTUALLY CONTAIN? 
The original two models for home rule laws were efforts at balance. The 
original imperio in imperium form of home rule responded to the restrictions of 
Dillon’s Rule by empowering local governments in a limited sphere of “local or 
municipal matters” and protecting them against override in local affairs.37 The 
1950s effort broadened the sphere of local authority (to “all delegable” 
legislative authority) but paired that with a barely-limited ability of the state 
legislature to override (and is hence sometimes called “legislative” home rule).38 
 
 35 See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES 
INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 4, 
12 (2001).  
 36 See Bill Nordwall (@billnordwall), TWITTER (Apr. 19, 2017, 2:43 PM), 
https://twitter.com/billnordwall/status/854765246849863680 (on file with the Ohio State 
Law Journal) (picturing a house with such signs). 
 37 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 10–12; see also BAKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 318. 
 38 City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 93-0690 (La. 7/5/94); 640 So. 2d 237, 243; 
see PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 12; see also BAKER ET AL., supra note 1, at 319. 
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As the Report notes, across the states, there is a mix of each of these styles of 
home rule, along with a whole host of other differences.39 Further, the difference 
between these broad systems has declined: courts have interpreted the initiative 
and immunity portions of imperio home rule differently, creating very 
substantial spaces where cities can propose laws but can be overruled by 
states—a type of legislative home rule inside imperio systems.40  
This year’s effort, the Report, is not an effort at balance. It proposes a series 
of reforms.  
A. Local Authority 
Much like the 1950s AMA model constitutional amendment, the Model 
Article starts off with a grant to local governments of the power to legislate on 
any topic within its territorial bounds, bounded only by the terms of the state 
constitution and valid preemptive state laws.41 But it would expand that grant 
even further, removing restrictions on local governmental authority commonly 
found in state constitutions.42 The Model Article suggests that states remove any 
restrictions on local governmental power to pass new taxes or “private laws” 
like contract or tort laws.43 It would also give local governments extensive 
power to engage in interlocal contracting, through a suggestion that they adopt 
the “power of one unit” approach, which allows local governments to contract 
with each other to do anything either government has the power to do.44 Further, 
this section adds an interpretative clause that explicitly overrules Dillon’s Rule 
of narrow construction of legislative grants to local governments, and replaces 
with its opposite: a rule that any doubt about local authority be resolved in favor 
of its existence.45  
B. Presumption Against Preemption 
Rather than freely allowing preemption, the Model Article creates a 
presumption against preemption.46 This contains a number of elements. The 
Model Article requires any preemptive state law to be explicit, banning implied 
 
 39 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 13.  
 40 See, e.g., Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d 813, 820 (Cal. 2005) 
(describing areas of mixed state and local concern in which cities can propose regulations 
but state can override them despite imperio-style home rule provision); Town of Telluride v. 
Lot Thirty-Four Venture, L.L.C., 3 P.3d 30, 37 (Colo. 2000) (explaining the same).  
 41 PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 34.  
 42 See id. at 38–40. 
 43 See id. at 24, 34. 
 44 See Reynolds, supra note 32, at 122, 135 (describing the “power of one unit” 
approach). 
 45 PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 51. 
 46 Id. at 26, 35. 
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or field preemption.47 Further, a state may preempt local authority “only if 
necessary to serve a substantial state interest, only if narrowly tailored to that 
interest, and only by general law.”48 The first two are pretty self-explanatory, 
requiring substantial justification and evidence that the same end could not have 
been achieved through less preemptive means. The last requirement—“general 
law”—is a term of art, drawn from an Ohio judicial decision which bars much 
more than ordinary state constitutional limitations on “special legislation.”49 To 
constitute a general law, a preemptive state law must: 
 
 47 See id. at 53–54 (requiring “express-only” preemption and directly banning implied 
preemption). 
 48 Id. at 35. 
 49 The rule is taken from City of Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 
766 N.E.2d 963, ¶ 21, in which the Ohio Supreme Court overruled an effort by the state to 
force localities to allow manufactured housing. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 59. The fact 
that the Report would borrow a rule from a decision protecting such a blatantly exclusionary 
regulation—one clearly intended to limit the construction of affordable housing—reveals a 
great deal about what it was willing to ignore in order to find legal doctrines that protect 
local authority. See Anika Singh Lemar, The Role of States in Liberalizing Land Use 
Regulations, 97 N.C. L. REV. 293, 318–19 (2019) (showing that manufactured housing 
provides naturally-occurring affordable housing but is banned by many local governments 
as part of efforts to keep the poor out); Daniel K. Mandelker, Zoning Barriers to 
Manufactured Housing, 48 URBAN LAWYER 233, 233 (2016) (“Manufactured housing is a 
major affordable housing resource for millions of people. . . . [Z]oning barriers are all too 
common.”). Further, the status of Canton in Ohio law is extremely sharply disputed, with 
several Ohio Supreme Court justices calling for its reversal. See City of Dayton v. State, 151 
Ohio St.3d 168, 2017-Ohio-6909, 87 N.E.3d 176, ¶ 54 (DeWine, J., dissenting) (“As 
demonstrated by a decade and a half of inconsistent case law—now including the lead 
opinion and concurrence in this case—the Canton test has proved unworkable. It is time we 
abandon the test and return to the language of the Home Rule Amendment.”); Id. ¶ 47 
(O’Neill, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (“[T]he test created in Canton v. State has become 
unworkable and . . . home-rule cases should be resolved by applying the text of the 
Constitution.”). Canton requires legislation apply equally to private and government 
officials, seemingly ruling out much state law that governs local governmental processes. 
For instance, Canton is pretty explicit that state laws setting standards about how local 
governments go about passing zoning laws would not be general laws. See City of Canton 
¶ 37 (finding a state ban on local prohibitions on manufactured housing to violate the state’s 
home rule provision because the state did not prescribe zoning for the whole state and instead 
only regulated the decisions of government officials). The Report states, in extremely 
question-begging fashion: 
To be sure, the Canton test is more robust than many states’ general-law requirements. 
In application, however, the Canton test does not prohibit all state regulation of local 
governments qua local governments, nor does it require that state law apply equally to 
local governments and to citizens generally. . . . The specification of the essential 
characteristics of an appropriately “general” exercise of the police power—including 
the concept that the state cannot solely single out local authority in order for state 
legislation to be considered “general”—provides courts with functional criteria and 
prevents the state from disabling local authority in the absence of a legitimate statewide 
regulatory purpose. 
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[B]e part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment; apply to all 
parts of the state alike and operate uniformly throughout the state; set forth 
police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than purport only to grant or limit 
legislative power of a home rule government to set forth police, sanitary, or 
similar regulations; and prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally.50  
Also, state regulations are understood to be “floors” unless there is express 
preemption.51 Localities can regulate more strictly but cannot permit weaker 
regulations.52 The Model Article also bans “punitive preemption,” or state laws 
aimed at stopping local governments from even challenging preemptive state 
laws.53  
The presumption against preemption in the Model Article would be a radical 
change from the way preemption is analyzed in any state. Most, although not 
all, of these provisions exist in some states, but the full suite of protections for 
local authority is unique to the Report.54 Replacing a local law would go from a 
relatively easy thing for state legislatures to do to something that would require 
an express statement, the provision of a strong justification, an effort at narrow 
tailoring, and most radically, a replacement with a clear substantive state 
standard that applies everywhere in the state.55 There would be substantial limits 
on the ability of states to direct local governance, as the general law standard 
requires that preemptive state laws apply equally to governmental and private 
citizens and proscribe rules of conduct, rather than processes.56 Given limited 
state legislative capacity (both time and resources), this system would give 
localities either free rein to do what they wanted and/or huge power over the 
state legislative agenda, given the extensive time and effort legislatures would 
need to devote to knocking down local laws.57  
 
PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 59–60. The problem with this is that the interpretation the Report 
suggests Canton has had “in application” conflicts with the actual text the Model Article 
suggests for state constitutions. Perhaps Ohio courts have not taken the decision as far as the 
rhetoric contained within (although it has been used to overrule many preemptive state laws, 
as the Report notes). See id. at 59. But states adopting the constitutional text would likely 
start their analysis with, well, the text. And the text—and Canton itself—is pretty clear that 
laws that regulate local governmental decisions, rather than establishing specific substantive 
standards, are not allowed. And even the narrowest reading of Canton and the general law 
requirement would be particularly protective of local zoning and planning authority, which 
is one of the weaknesses of the Report as a whole. See City of Canton ¶ 38 (“[T]his statute, 
which attempts to limit the ability of political subdivisions to zone their communities as they 
see fit, strikes at the heart of municipal home rule: the orderly planning of a city”). 
 50 PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 35.  
 51 See id. at 60. 
 52 Id. at 35. 
 53 Id. at 21, 66.  
 54 See id. at 12–19. 
 55 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 54, 56, 58. 
 56 See id. at 59. 
 57 See id. at 60 (noting that the general law requirement “impos[es] a high bar on the 
state”). 
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C. Local Democratic Self-Government  
Not content to end there, the Report goes on to establish an extra powerful 
presumption against preemption for local laws governing the structure of 
government or local elections.58 Preemptive state laws in the areas of the 
organization of local government or local elections must be “acting to advance 
an overriding state concern.”59 State courts have always been more protective 
of local democracy than other areas of local power, but this codifies and 
strengthens this.60  
D. State Support for Local Democracy 
Finally, the Model Article creates an affirmative right for local governments 
and residents to state funds.61 The state legislature would be required to provide 
“equitable access to adequate intergovernmental aid to local governments.”62 
This would effectively make all local services subject to the type of adequacy 
requirements we generally see in education clauses in state constitutions. The 
Report is extremely vague about what this requires, though. The basic concept 
is that the state would have an affirmative obligation to tax sufficiently and 
spend broadly enough to give local governments sufficient resources to provide 
a completely-undefined minimum level of services.63  
The Model Article also recommends limits on the ability of the state to put 
conditions on aid, outside of the expenditure of money granted, and bars the 
removal of state aid as a penalty for a local government exercising its home rule 
authority.64  
There are a few other small things in there, but it should be clear that this is 
not a restatement in the traditional sense. Many of the provisions are found in 
the law of some state or another, but there is no state that even comes close to 
this level of delegation to local authority.65 Notably, the Report also explicitly 
eschews suggesting any limits or changes to the laws governing incorporation, 
annexation, or secession.66 The new powers would be granted to all home rule 
 
 58 PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 36.  
 59 Id. at 30. 
 60 See Joshua S. Sellers & Erin A. Scharff, Preempting Politics: State Power and Local 
Democracy, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1380 (2020) (“State courts have treated laws that 
preempt local governments’ structural decisions more skeptically than laws that preempt 
local regulatory authority.”). 
 61 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 37. 
 62 Id. 
 63 See id. at 73. 
 64 Id. at 37. 
 65 To be fair, the Article does not include an imperio-style immunity from preemption 
provision. See supra text accompanying notes 37–40 (describing imperio-style home rule 
provisions). But, it is pretty clear (to this scholar at least) that the Article would be more 
protective of local authority than any actual state’s constitution by a substantial amount.  
 66 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 31. 
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governments—not to all towns and villages, but to all governments currently 
granted home rule authority.67 This universe varies by state, but almost 
inevitably includes many cities in a given metropolitan area.68 
Both imperio and the 1950s-era AMA version of home rule were understood 
as responses to particular policy problems and to the failures of the local 
government law regimes that came before them.69 This report poses itself in the 
same way, an institutional design response to contemporary problems and to 
flaws that have emerged in the application of existing systems of home rule.70 
 
 67 See id. at 38–39. 
 68 For instance, only roughly one-third of the 101 municipalities in the Boston metro 
area have decided to adopt city charters, but any of them could. DAVID J. BARRON, GERALD 
E. FRUG, & RICK T. SU, RAPPAPORT INST. FOR GREATER BOS., DISPELLING THE MYTH OF 
HOME RULE: LOCAL POWER IN GREATER BOSTON 4 (2004), https://www.mma.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/homerule_myth_legalstructure_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5DY-
P9AN] (explaining legal structure of home rule in Massachusetts). Under the California 
Constitution, California cities can adopt a charter giving themselves full home rule authority. 
CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3(a); LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, GENERAL LAW CITY V. CHARTER CITY 
(2011), https://www.cacities.org/Resources-Documents/Resources-Section/Charter-Cities/ 
Chart_General_Law_v-_Charter_Cities-07-26-11 [https://perma.cc/2JBT-8TDK] (describing 
the powers of charter cities and non-charter “general law” cities). Currently, California has 
121 Charter cities. LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, CHARTER CITIES (2007), https://www.cacities.org 
/Resources-Documents/Resources-Section/Charter-Cities/Charter_Cities-List [https://per 
ma.cc/9MPY-9QYR].  
 69 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 9–13 (discussing the history and the impetus behind 
home rule). 
 70 The Report is heavy on the latter but lacking in the former. I have argued that laws 
governing local authority—from Dillon’s Rule to home rule—have tracked and responded 
to the nature of agglomeration economies extant at the time. David Schleicher, The City as 
a Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1507, 1513–15 (2010) (arguing that both 
Dillon’s Rule and home rule provisions responded to changes in the economic sources of 
urban advantage). One might imagine that the Report would tie its recommendations to 
something about how the nature of the economy has changed. But the Report does not even 
really try to do this. It starts off by stating that urban and metropolitan populations and 
economies have grown substantially in recent years. PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 14–15. 
True enough! But that fact does not necessarily imply anything about the powers of local 
governments. Density likely creates more demand for government services, but it is not 
necessary that these services be provided by general-purpose local governments, rather than 
special-purpose local governments, public authorities, regional governments or the state 
directly. It is not clear that densification has created greater diversity of preferences and 
needs, justifying more powers for local governments. In many ways, metropolitan areas are 
more similar to one another than ever, as the economy has become more dependent on 
services (which are similar place to place) and less on goods (different goods are produced 
in different places). Cf. Ryan Avent, Hyperglobalisation and Metropolitan Gravity, 
ECONOMIST: FREE EXCH. (Oct. 24, 2013), https://www.economist.com/node/21003975/ 
blogs/freeexchange/2010/01/18805673?page=59 [https://perma.cc/H5NM-GBDB]. Further, 
metropolitan growth creates substantial downsides for local regulatory power, as it makes it 
extremely likely that most individuals spend their days governed by multiple local 
governments (people commute to different places to work, different places to shop, etc.). In 
contrast, in rural areas, people are more likely to live and work in one local government. 
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It mentions the increased urbanization of America and recent policy innovation 
by some cities.71 
It does not take much critical reading to see that the report is not quite what 
it claims to be. The report is clearly spurred by recent efforts by Republican-led 
state legislatures to preempt local authority in largely Democratic cities, 
sometimes through particularly coercive tools like “punitive preemption.”72 The 
motivation for the piece is clearly stated here: 
States, however, are increasingly violating the spirit of this oversight authority. 
North Carolina’s preemption in the spring of 2016 of an ordinance passed by 
Charlotte that would have extended the city’s antidiscrimination protections to 
gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people brought national attention to 
current state-local conflicts; similar examples have become commonplace. At 
least twenty-five states, for example, currently use their authority to preempt 
local minimum wage laws while twenty-two states prohibit local paid sick 
leave ordinances. In the public health arena, thirteen states now ban local food 
and nutrition policies, ten states prevent local governments from regulating e-
cigarettes, and forty-three states limit the authority of local governments to 
regulate firearm safety. Similar statistics can be found for policies as diverse 
as civil rights, the environment, and emerging technologies (such as broadband 
and autonomous vehicles), not to mention core local governance functions such 
as municipal finance and local elections.73 
In its treatment of preemption, the Report is unbalanced, both rhetorically 
and substantively, including an ideological bent that it does not attempt to 
justify. More problematically, it does not even seem cognizant of other problems 
of local governance that the Model Article will worsen, even though those 
problems are a far bigger deal. And the Report barely discusses the potential 
radical elements of its fiscal proposals, providing almost no detail or explanation 
of what they mean, while attention is lavished on exploring the justifications for 
and elements of their preemption proposal.  
III: THE POLITICAL FAILURE OF THE NLC REPORT 
Let’s start with the Report’s obsession. The Report clearly understands the 
central, contemporary problem of local government to be that there are a bunch 
of mean, mean Republican-controlled state legislatures that keep overruling 
local authority in Democratic-run cities. States of all sorts, they argue, need to 
 
Exactly what connection the Report seeks to draw between increased urbanization and the 
empowerment of extant municipal governments is left unexplained.  
 71 PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 14–15. 
 72 See Richard Briffault, Nestor Davidson, Paul A. Diller, Olatunde Johnson, & Richard 
C. Schragger, The Troubling Turn in State Preemption: The Assault on Progressive Cities 
and How Cities Can Respond, 11 ADVANCE: J. ACS ISSUE BRIEFS 3, 3–4 (2017).  
 73 PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 16–17. 
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change their constitutions to stop this plague of preemption.74 Notably, despite 
citing dozens of examples of preemption, the report mentions zero cases of 
home rule protecting non-politically liberal or left outcomes. It also barely 
mentions any cases about issues that do not neatly track national partisan 
alignments. 
This bias towards treasuring local authority when it is liberal or left, but not 
when it takes other political forms is not merely rhetorical. In the presumption 
against preemption section, the report proposes that state constitutions be 
amended to be explicit that: 
A home rule government may exercise and perform concurrently with the state 
any governmental, corporate, or proprietary power or function to the extent that 
the Legislature has not preempted local law pursuant to the preceding 
paragraphs. In exercising concurrent authority, a home rule government may 
not set standards and requirements that are lower or less stringent than those 
imposed by state law, but may set standards and requirements that are higher 
or more stringent than those imposed by state law, unless a state law provides 
otherwise.75 
The bias towards more regulation rather than less is clear. Absent express 
preemption, the state’s regulatory standards are not rules to be adopted until 
local government act to strengthen or weaken them; they are always floors 
above which local governments can go. In justifying this, the report says: “For 
example, this latter clause helps local governments promote interests that are 
important to them—such as raising minimum wage requirements, broadening 
labor benefits, or strengthening environmental protections—but blocks local 
governments from acting to weaken state regulatory standards.”76 It is not hard 
to see what the authors of the Report think the point of the Article is.  
As a matter of rhetoric, the Report broadly embraces local governance as a 
process value, suggesting it allows variation, experimentation, and fit to local 
tastes.77 But variation, experimentation, and fit could be achieved through local 
regimes that were looser than state regulations too. The Report and Article do 
not allow for those outcomes. The arguments the Report offers do not fit with 
its clear ideological direction. 
The Report could have made an effort to justify the left-bias of its approach. 
It could have simply said that the country needs more regulation and this is a 
good way to achieve it. After all, state constitutional amendments are often 
substantive, and there is nothing wrong with arguing that sections of the state 
constitution that deal with local government should enshrine a particular 
ideological vision. But it would then have to justify those arguments, rather than 
simply arguing in terms of devolution. 
 
 74 See generally PRINCIPLES, supra note 1. 
 75 Id. at 35. 
 76 Id. at 60.  
 77 Id. 
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Or the Report could argue that Republican Party preemption of “blue cities” 
is a particular problem requiring constitutional intervention. Paul Diller, 
drawing on Jonathan Rodden’s work, has argued convincingly that the fact that 
state legislatures use districted elections packs liberal urbanites into heavily 
Democratic districts, leaving state legislatures more Republican than the median 
voter.78 Diller argues that home rule is a good response to this political 
problem.79 Many others agree.80 But to do that it would have to take a clear 
partisan stance that there is something wrong with the power Republicans have 
in state legislatures.  
Either way, the Report would have to acknowledge that it is not simply 
making process-based arguments. Instead, it tries to hide an ideological agenda 
behind facially-neutral arguments about institutional design and the nature of 
local governance in the twenty-first century. 
One wonders who the authors of this Report think their audience is. What 
person not convinced of the substance of the authors’ politics would accept a 
proposal with such a clear ideological valance? If the Report is going to propose 
something this ideological, why not just say that these are constitutional 
amendments primarily aimed at helping the cause of the Democratic Party in 
the South and Southwest? That would be something that readers could engage 
with. Instead, the Report pretends that an ideological effort is actually a neutral 
application of institutional design principles. 
This is a political failure. The Report is not likely to fool anyone with its 
neutral language and should just have been clear about its political goals.  
IV. THE POLICY FAILURES OF THE NLC REPORT 
In its effort to address the problem of conservative legislative preemption, 
the Report ignores virtually everything else happening in local governance, 
including many problems that the Model Article would exacerbate. In a long 
Report full of examples of modern policy problems, here are some that are not 
mentioned or only barely discussed: exclusionary zoning, segregation, local 
 
 78 See Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home Rule: Part 1—The Urban Disadvantage in 
National and State Lawmaking, 77 LA. L. REV. 287, 336–51 (2016) (arguing that systematic 
Republican advantage in state legislatures provides a justification for home rule); see also 
JONATHAN RODDEN, WHY CITIES LOSE: THE DEEP ROOTS OF THE URBAN-RURAL POLITICAL 
DIVIDE 1–3, 7–13 (2019) (arguing that because districts in dense cities naturally pack 
together left-leaning voters, the use of districting—rather than propositional 
representation—aids right-leaning parties). 
 79 See Paul A. Diller, Reorienting Home Rule: Part 2—Remedying the Urban 
Disadvantage through Federalism and Localism, 77 LA. L. REV. 1045, 1077–96 (2017). 
 80 See David A. Graham, Red State, Blue City, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/03/red-state-blue-city/513857/ 
[https://perma.cc/U2AB-5BQ6] (arguing that “Red State” preemption is a major social 
problem); see also Kalena Thomhave, Blue City Challenge: Clawing Back Power from Red 
States, AM. PROSPECT (May 15, 2019), https://prospect.org/economy/blue-city-challenge-
clawing-back-power-red-states/ [https://perma.cc/3GRY-5WJ6] (same). 
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subsidies for company location (think Amazon HQ2), annexation and secession, 
municipal bankruptcies (like Detroit), and local pension problems. Its one-
paragraph discussion of Ferguson, Missouri suggests that granting that city more 
authority will make its decisions fairer, ignoring the deep problems of 
representation and accountability in local democracy in places like Ferguson.81 
Its one paragraph discussion of the single-most important local power—control 
over land use and zoning—cites only few contradictory and vague potential 
limits on local authority.82 
The economic and social harms created by local exclusion through zoning 
and other regulations, local democratic failure, inter-local conflicts and resource 
hoarding, and local fiscal crises are much bigger problems than the ones 
addressed in this report. But the Report is so obsessed with problematic forms 
of state preemption that it proposes changes that will exacerbate these other 
problems.  
Let me go through these a little more directly. 
A. Zoning and Exclusion 
Zoning and other land use controls have always been about exclusion, at 
least in part.83 Starting soon after the Supreme Court struck down racial zoning 
in Buchanan v. Warley, the first zoning codes in the United States were 
committed to keeping single-family areas free from apartments and flop houses, 
and did so in part to keep these areas racially and economically exclusive.84 
During the post-World War II era, the desire for a single-family home of one’s 
own away from densely populated, racially-diverse cities helped drive 
suburbanization, among other forces.85 The use of zoning and other land use 
controls like minimum lot sizes in suburbs stopped newly-built suburbs from 
ever densifying.86 Zoning was far from the only tool of racial and economic 
 
 81 PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 45. 
 82 Id. 
 83 There were, and are, many other goals, of course–such as nuisance minimization and 
planning public services.  
 84 See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917); SONIA A. HIRT, ZONED IN THE USA: 
THE ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS OF AMERICAN LAND-USE REGULATION 1–15 (2014) 
(describing how zoning in the United States has always been unique from any other system 
in the world to the extent it protects single-family home zones from apartments or retail); 
SEYMOUR I. TOLL, ZONED AMERICAN 190–210 (1969) (describing how the protection of 
single family zones was a crucial factor in zoning’s popularity and spread); TROUNSTINE, 
supra note 17, at 84 (making a direct connection between the rise of economic zoning and 
decline of racial zoning). 
 85 See generally Robert J. Reinstein, Gerald McFadden, Susan A. Feder, & Robert E. 
Kerper, Jr., A Case of Exclusionary Zoning, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 7 (1972) (outlining the post-war 
suburban boom as well as the racial and zoning issues that helped instigate it). 
 86 See TROUNSTINE, supra note 17, at 185; Robert C. Ellickson, The Zoning Strait-
Jacket: The Freezing of American Neighborhoods of Single-Family Houses 9–23 (Jan. 7, 
2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal) (showing that, 
900 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:5 
segregation, nor was exclusion the only goal of zoning. But the two are certainly 
and necessarily intertwined.87  
Through the 1970s and 1980s, the central political challenge to zoning was 
that it was economically and racially exclusive at the level of the individual 
town.88 Rich suburbs used zoning to reduce construction and to ensure high per 
capita property values, keeping outsiders from accessing the high quality 
services paid for with taxes on those high per capita property values.89 There 
were well-known legal and political challenges to exclusionary zoning in the 
suburbs, from the Mt. Laurel cases to the Fair Housing Act’s requirement that 
federal agencies encourage recipients of federal money to “affirmatively further 
fair housing.”90 Well-known legal scholar Charles Haar famously argued that 
there should be a “constitutional right to live in the suburbs.”91  
But no one thought zoning had effects on housing prices at the regional 
level. Big cities, a few pro-growth suburbs, and exurban areas allowed for 
enough construction of new housing such that people could be housed and 
access regional job markets.92  
But, starting in the 1970s and 1980s, this changed.93 As demand to live in 
them increased, big cities in our richest and most innovative metropolitan areas 
became less hospitable to growth, and sprawl hit some natural limits (and the 
few pro-growth suburbs changed their tune).94 Each town and city excluded new 
development and, in so doing, created limits on growth at the metropolitan 
level.95 When paired with strong demand, zoning restrictions started to drive up 
 
once built, single-family neighborhoods with detached houses in the United States rarely 
ever densify, largely because of zoning regulations). 
 87 See generally Reinstein et al., supra note 85. 
 88 See Schleicher, City Unplanning, supra note 16, at 1684 (reviewing the literature). 
 89 See Bruce W. Hamilton, Zoning and Property Taxation in a System of Local 
Governments, 12 URB. STUD. 205, 210–11 (1975); Schleicher, City Unplanning, supra note 
16, 1680–92. 
 90 See Robert G. Schwemm, Overcoming Structural Barriers to Integrated Housing: A 
Back-to-the-Future Reflection on the Fair Housing Act’s “Affirmatively Further” Mandate, 
100 KY. L.J. 125, 127 (2011) (discussing history of affirmatively furthering fair housing 
requirement in the Fair Housing Act). See generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Essay, Saving 
Mount Laurel?, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611 (2013) (discussing the Mount Laurel cases and 
their aftermath). 
 91 CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES 
133–36 (1996).   
 92 See Schleicher, City Unplanning, supra note 16, at 1693. 
 93 See generally Fischel, supra note 16; Ganong & Shoag, supra note 17. 
 94 See Schleicher, City Unplanning, supra note 16, at 1692–99 (describing increased 
restrictiveness of cities). See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Zoning and the Cost of Housing: 
Evidence from Silicon Valley, Greater New Have, and Greater Austin (Jan. 20, 2020) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal) (describing the decline 
of pro-growth suburbs). 
 95 See Schleicher, City Unplanning, supra note 16, at 1692–99. 
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prices at the regional level in places like San Francisco and New York.96 This 
process has even stalled national economic convergence.97 In the hundred or so 
years before the 1980s, the poorest and richest states were getting closer together 
in per capita economic performance, as capital flowed to poor states and workers 
moved to richer ones.98 But, among strictly zoned states, this process slowed in 
the 1980s and has now stopped completely.99  
The collective effects of local land use rules in rich metropolitan areas on 
the broader economy are enormous. We have had economic booms in some 
metropolitan areas—Silicon Valley, New York—but not boomtowns, as 
workers cannot move to the places where their labor is most valuable and best 
remunerated.100 Scholars using a variety of methods have attempted to estimate 
how big an effect this is, and the numbers they have come up with are almost 
incomprehensibly large.101 For instance, two prominent papers find that the 
negative effect of zoning restrictions in just three big, rich metropolitan areas is 
larger than eight percent of the U.S. economy.102 And these effects are all based 
on the effect zoning regulations have on current wages—that is, how much more 
people would earn if they were able to move—not on the effect on innovation, 
which is also linked to greater density in rich metros.103  
The effect zoning regulations have had on economic inequality is no less 
dramatic. In rich regions, housing prices have appreciated so much that we 
regularly describe them as suffering from a housing crisis, not just in a few 
isolated areas, but in the entire state of California and in metro areas like New 
York, Washington D.C., and Boston (with other metros catching up).104 When 
 
 96 See Edward L. Glaeser, Joseph Gyourko, & Raven Saks, Why Is Manhattan So 
Expensive? Regulation and the Rise in Housing Prices, 48 J.L. & ECON. 331, 332–51 (2005) 
(discussing effects on prices); Schleicher, City Unplanning, supra note 16, at 1692–99 
(same). 
 97 Ganong & Shoag, supra note 17, at 89–90. 
 98 See id. at 76. 
 99 Id. 
 100 See Schleicher, Stuck, supra note 17, at 83, 101; Emily Badger, What Happened to 
the American Boomtown?, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.ny 
times.com/2017/12/06/upshot/what-happened-to-the-american-boomtown.html [https://per 
ma.cc/9L45-8YRN].  
 101 See generally, e.g., Hsieh & Moretti, supra note 17 (estimating land use restrictions 
in just a few metropolitan areas decrease GDP by more than eight percent); Gilles Duranton 
& Diego Puga, Urban Growth and Its Aggregate Implications (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 26491, 2019) (same); Kyle F. Herkenhoff, Lee E. Ohanian, & 
Edward C. Prescott, Tarnishing the Golden and Empire States: Land-Use Restrictions and 
the U.S. Economic Slowdown (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23790, 
2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w23790.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2DX-FYVM] (finding 
that deregulating all regions to 1980 levels of land use law would increase productivity by 
ten percent). 
 102 See Hsieh & Moretti, supra note 17, at 26; Duranton & Puga, supra note 101, at 3. 
 103 See Schleicher, City Unplanning, supra note 16, at 1692–99 (making this argument).  
 104 See, e.g., Jill Cowan, Can the Housing Crisis Be Solved?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/21/us/california-affordable-housing.html 
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housing prices increase, the rich can continue to move in, but poorer residents 
cannot, and thus the rich can access job markets and growth opportunities denied 
to others.105 Matthew Rognile shows that a large percentage of Thomas 
Piketty’s famous “R>G” finding comes from appreciation in land prices.106 And 
high housing prices have created a homelessness crisis in many places.107 
Further, density limits in dense cities and inner ring suburbs create vast amounts 
of extra greenhouse gas emissions, as they encourage people to live far away 
and commute by car or to move to regions that are less dense and hence more 
car dependent.108  
These new inter-regional effects of zoning on migration and economic 
growth did not mean that the pre-1980 analysis that zoning in rich towns led to 
segregation and tax hoarding went away.109 Just the opposite; they became more 
extreme.110 And tax hoarding and segregation are problems everywhere, 
occurring not just in the Los Angeleses and Bostons of the country, but in almost 
every metropolitan area.111  
The housing crisis, slow economic growth, and segregation are major social 
problems. Economists and political scientists have shown that local 
governments’ land use regulations are a major cause of each of these 
problems.112 Any comprehensive discussion about local power in 2020 should 
 
[https://perma.cc/3VLA-EV63] (describing California’s housing crisis); Eric Kober, 
Supply-Side Housing Solutions, CITY J. (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.city-journal.org/supply 
-side-solutions-ny-housing-shortage [https://perma.cc/7T9C-ZZAW] (describing New 
York’s housing crisis); Shirley Leung, We Need More–and Faster–Fixes for the Housing 
Crisis, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2019/10/16/ 
need-more-and-faster-fixes-for-housing-crisis/kidZt6ss0b1p42CgD6pHHP/story.html 
[https://perma.cc/BHK5-7ETY] (describing Boston’s housing crisis); Robert McCartney, 
D.C. Region’s Leaders Face Big Challenges as They Tackle Affordable-Housing Shortage, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-regions-leaders-
face-big-challenges-as-they-tackle-affordable-housing-shortage/2019/09/03/8d155496-
ce77-11e9-8c1c-7c8ee785b855_story.html [https://perma.cc/FVV6-BFFW] (describing 
Washington D.C.’s housing crisis). 
 105 See Schleicher, Stuck, supra note 17, at 81–83, 101, 104–07. See generally Ganong 
& Shoag, supra note 17.  
 106 See generally Matthew Rognlie, Deciphering the Fall and Rise in the Net Capital 
Share: Accumulation or Scarcity?, 2015 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 1 (2015).  
 107 See GABRIEL PETEK, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, THE 2020–21 
BUDGET: THE GOVERNOR’S HOMELESSNESS PLAN 1, 3 (2020), https://lao.ca.gov/reports/ 
2020/4152/homelessness-plan-021120.pdf [https://perma.cc/N95Z-3C24] (explaining how 
housing costs in California have led to homelessness).  
 108 See Christopher Jones & Daniel M. Kammen, Spatial Distribution of U.S. Household 
Carbon Footprints Reveals Suburbanization Undermines Greenhouse Gas Benefits of Urban 
Population Density, 48 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 895, 900 (2014). 
 109 See TROUNSTINE, supra note 17, at 78–97.  
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. at 88 (explaining the sample sizes of Trounstine’s calculations of zoning trends 
include 4,293 city-years from 240 cities). 
 112 See John Infranca, The New State Zoning: Land Use Preemption Amid a Housing 
Crisis, 60 B.C. L. REV. 823, 830–34 (2019) (describing how land use regulation contributes 
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address the problems created by excessive zoning restrictions. But here’s the 
sum of what the Report says about the problem of local exclusion. 
No level or type of government is perfect and there can be legitimate 
governance concerns at the local level. Local governments can be parochial or 
insular and some have undoubtedly used their authority for invidious 
exclusion. As much as these issues must be addressed—they must and can 
through a variety of appropriately targeted legal doctrines—it is still critical 
not to let specific local challenges be a reason to disenfranchise local 
governments generally.113  
This is the “#NotAllMen” of local government law arguments.114 To say 
that a few local governments engage in exclusion is to ignore the modern reality 
that most local governments—particularly rich ones—engage in exclusion to 
one degree or another, and a huge number do so in ways that both harm 
economic efficiency and equity. The cumulative effect of this exclusion is to 
create huge economic and social problems. #NotAllLocalGovernments just will 
not do as a claim here.  
States already give local governments the power to zone and to pass other 
land use regulations.115 But the Model Article would bar many efforts to restrict 
local authority over land use, and thus would make local exclusion an even 
bigger problem. 
For most of the history of zoning, local governments were largely given free 
rein to regulate land uses and densities as they saw fit.116 In the 1960s and 70s, 
a “quiet revolution” led to states being more involved in land use.117 Many of 
the regulations from this era created a “double veto” for development, creating 
another hurdle for developers.118  
 
to the housing crisis); see also Jessica Trounstine, The Geography of Inequality: How Land 
Use Regulation Produces Segregation, 114 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 443, 449–53 (2020) 
(describing how land use regulation contributes to segregation); Duranton & Puga, supra 
note 101, at 2 (describing how land use regulation contributes to slow economic growth). 
 113 PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 19. 
 114 See generally Jess Zimmerman, Not All Men: A Brief History of Every Dude’s 
Favorite Argument, TIME (Apr. 28, 2014), https://time.com/79357/not-all-men-a-brief-
history-of-every-dudes-favorite-argument/ (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal).  
 115 See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390–97 (1926). See generally 
David L. Krooth, Control of Land Use in the United States: Statutory Developments and the 
Case of New Communities, 4 URB. LAW. 519 (1972) (noting the delegation of land use power 
from states to local governments). 
 116 See Patricia E. Salkin, The Quiet Revolution and Federalism: Into the Future, 45 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 253, 257 (2012). 
 117 See id. at 254–55 (describing the history of the “quiet revolution”). See generally 
FRED BOSSELMAN & DAVID CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL 
(1971) (describing and naming the Quiet Revolution).  
 118 See Fischel, supra note 16, at 28; Christopher S. Elmendorf, Beyond the Double Veto: 
Housing Plans as Preemptive Intergovernmental Compacts, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 79, 82 (2019) 
(describing the history of “double veto”). Notably, because of the Model Article’s statement 
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But in recent years, however, state concern with collective action among 
local government, for the welfare of residents outside of local boundaries and 
renters, as well as worries about broader economic growth, have led to many 
state efforts at preempting local authority.119 California has beefed up its 
“regional housing needs assessment” system to—for the first time—ask cities 
to allow real increases in housing growth, and taken steps toward imposing 
penalties in the form of “builder’s remedies” for not doing so.120 California also 
adopted a state version of the federal law affirmatively furthering fair housing 
requirements.121 Oregon requires local governments to allow duplexes on 
substantially all lots and to allow for the building of more dense building types 
somewhere in every single-family zone in big cities.122 Just this year, states from 
Nebraska to Virginia have considered substantial statewide reforms.123 Other 
states have proposed tying transportation or other funding streams to local 
relaxation of zoning regulations.124 
 
that local laws, particularly environmental laws, can be stricter than state standards absent a 
clear preemptive statement by the legislature, but not less strict, most of the Quiet Revolution 
laws would continue to apply their “double veto” of new development.   
 119 Elmendorf, supra note 118, at 85–95 (describing rise of pro-housing state 
interventions); Infranca, supra note 112, at 836–46 (describing the same). 
 120 See Elmendorf, supra note 118, at 100–05 (describing California reforms). They did 
not go as far as they should have gone in beefing up RHNA allocation levels, but there have 
already been substantial changes. See Hillary Davis, Julia Sclafani, & Luke Money, Potential 
Housing Mandates Take Coastal Cities by Surprise, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2019), 
https://www.latimes.com/socal/daily-pilot/news/story/2019-11-16/potential-housing-
mandates-take-coastal-cities-by-surprise [https://perma.cc/Y5YE-CBBN] (discussing the 
adoption of new higher housing targets for coastal cities in the Los Angeles region). 
 121 See California Enacts Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Law, NAT’L LOW 
INCOME COALITION (Oct. 9, 2018), https://nlihc.org/resource/california-enacts-affir 
matively-furthering-fair-housing-law [https://perma.cc/9FGJ-DTRW] (describing state fair 
housing law). 
 122 See Elmendorf, supra note 118, at 106 (describing Oregon reforms); Michael 
Andersen, Oregon Just Voted to Legalize Duplexes on Almost Every City Lot, SIGHTLINE 
INST. (June 30, 2019), https://www.sightline.org/2019/06/30/oregon-just-voted-to-legalize-
duplexes-on-almost-every-city-lot/ [https://perma.cc/K397-Q7Y7] (describing the same). 
 123 James Brasuell, ‘Missing Middle Housing Act’ Would Allow More Housing Options 
in Nebraska Residential Areas, PLANETIZEN (Jan. 13, 2020), https://www.planetizen.com/ 
news/2020/01/108025-missing-middle-housing-act-would-allow-more-housing-options-
nebraska-residential [https://perma.cc/58PJ-LNZ5] (describing proposal in Nebraska); 
Kriston Capps, With New Democratic Majority, Virginia Sees a Push for Denser Housing, 
BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/12/virginia-
legislature-statewide-upzoning-law-codes-ordinance/602818/ [https://perma.cc/SDH6-
ZTQA] (detailing a legislative proposal to relax zoning in Virginia). 
 124 Laura Bliss, California’s New Governor Would Punish Cities over Affordable 
Housing, BLOOMBERG CITYLAB (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.citylab.com/transportation 
/2019/01/gavin-newsom-housing-reform-transportation-budget-homeless/580192/ 
[https://perma.cc/3PN5-GLLA] (discussing Governor Newsom’s proposal to restrict 
transportation dollars for excessively restrictive cities). 
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All of these efforts would be at risk if a state adopted this form of home rule. 
While a state could preempt specific types of local zoning policy, it would have 
to target them narrowly and offer substantial justifications for each restriction. 
How many of the policies listed above would pass the test set out in the Model 
Article? How many of them would be sufficiently narrowly tailored? Would 
they be “general law” in that they apply equally to citizens and governments? 
What about laws like Massachusetts and Connecticut’s “anti-snob zoning” 
acts?125 The Minnesota planning requirements that led to the well-regarded 
Minneapolis 2040 replanning and upzoning?126 State laws preempting local 
regulations that ban mobile homes?127 I suspect many of these would not qualify 
as “general law” and would be struck down. At the very least, judges—who 
often represent NIMBYish local politics at their worst128—would have tons of 
new tools to strike down such efforts. And some state efforts, like conditioning 
spending on allowing new housing, would clearly be ruled out.  
Here’s the full extent of what a sixty-four page report and recommendation 
has to say about zoning, which is clearly one of, if not the, most important 
regulatory tools of local governments: 
Some courts—particularly in policy areas such as housing and the 
environment—have reminded local governments of their affirmative 
obligation to consider the impact of local policy on others outside the 
jurisdiction who might be significantly affected by the government’s exercise 
of its delegated police power authority. See, e.g., Associated Homebuilders, 
Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 487 (Cal. 1976) . . . Southern 
Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 
725, 726 (N.J. 1975) . . . . The Supreme Court too has recognized the 
 
 125 See generally Terry J. Tondro, Connecticut’s Affordable Housing Appeals Statute: 
After Ten Years of Hope, Why Only Middling Results?, 23 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 115 (2001) 
(discussing a similar law in Connecticut); Paul K. Stockman, Note, Anti-Snob Zoning in 
Massachusetts: Assessing One Attempt at Opening the Suburbs to Affordable Housing, 78 
VA. L. REV. 535 (1992) (discussing Massachusetts’s 40B “anti-snob” zoning act). 
 126 Land Use Planning—The Metropolitan Land Use Planning Act—Act of Apr. 2, 1976, 
Ch. 127, 1976 Minn. Laws 292, 3 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 305, 305–10 (1977) (analyzing the 
Minnesota replanning statute); Patrick Sisson, Can Minneapolis’s Radical Rezoning Be a 
National Model?, CURBED (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.curbed.com/2018/11/27/18113208 
/minneapolis-real-estate-rent-development-2040-zoning (on file with the Ohio State Law 
Journal).  
 127 See City of Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963, 
¶ 10–11 (striking down state law barring local governments from banning manufactured 
housing as a non-general law).  
 128 In New York City in recent months, courts have gone on a particular anti-
development tear. See Stefanos Chen, The People vs. Big Development, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/realestate/the-people-vs-big-development. 
html [https://perma.cc/WH5H-2P4K]; Steve Cuozzo, Opinion, Judges’ Suck-Up to the 
NIMBY Mob Puts Even Existing NYC Buildings at Risk, N.Y. POST (Feb. 18, 2020), 
https://nypost.com/2020/02/18/judges-suck-up-to-the-nimby-mob-puts-even-existing-nyc-
buildings-at-risk/ [https://perma.cc/728R-C7DU]. 
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possibility that extra-local impacts may impose limits on local governments. 
See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390 (1926). . . . 
 
In short, this provision acknowledges the general welfare limits embodied 
in many state constitutions as a possible limit on local authority exercised in 
accordance with this Article. . . . Moreover, states may have a substantial 
interest in ensuring that home rule governments share in the social, economic, 
environmental, or other responsibilities of a metropolitan area or region in 
which they are located, and that state interest could meet the requirements of 
Sections C and D of this Article, if tailored appropriately.129  
To start, the first paragraph is either confusing or confused. Livermore and 
Mt. Laurel do both acknowledge the possibility that local regulations might 
harm regional interests and thus go beyond statutory and constitutional limits 
on that city’s power.130 But Livermore denied a challenge to a moratorium on 
all development inside a city, effectively allowing local governments to exclude 
without constraint, despite creating the theoretical possibility that a city would 
exceed its zoning authority by creating regional harms.131 In contrast, Mt. Laurel 
is the single biggest judicial intrusion on local zoning authority, imposing 
serious constraints on local power.132 Citing them both for the same proposition 
is not false, but it is misleading. When Euclid—the classic case in which the 
Supreme Court announced that zoning was constitutionally permissible and that 
apartment houses in single-family neighborhoods were “mere parasite[s],” 
while including a throwaway line about potential regional harms—is added in, 
this paragraph becomes effectively meaningless.133 In a state that adopts the 
Model Article, a court still could limit local zoning authority, I suppose, but 
there is nothing in the Model Article or the Report that suggests they should do 
so.  
The second quoted paragraph notes that states could overrule local zoning 
rules if their preemptive efforts meet the requirements of express preemption, 
necessity, narrow tailoring, and sourcing from general law.134 But the whole 
point of the Report is to make exactly this kind of preemption harder!135  
Further, narrowly-tailored express preemption is an extraordinarily bad fit 
for addressing local exclusionary land use policies.136 Cities have a whole host 
 
 129 PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 49–50.  
 130 See id. at 50. 
 131 See Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 476, 487 (Cal. 
1976). 
 132 See generally Hills, Jr., supra note 90.  
 133 See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 392, 394–95 (1926). 
 134 PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 50. 
 135 Id. at 21. 
 136 Further, many types of local regulation do not have a large effect on housing prices 
on their own, but instead work as part of a web of regulations restricting housing supply and 
thus increasing housing prices. For instance, if a city engages in substantial amounts of 
historic preservation, it will not affect housing prices as a whole if the city allows lots of 
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of tools for restricting development: not only zoning, but discretionary reviews, 
subdivision requirements, impact fees, parking requirements, and many 
others.137 When states target one exclusionary policy, local governments 
regularly respond using their other tools, with restrictions coming back hydra-
like.138 As a result, the best states could do under the Model Article is to play 
whack-a-mole against the excesses of local restriction. At worst, there would be 
effectively nothing they could do to stop the richest places in America from 
stopping new development and profiting from the harm they create for the 
broader economy and the least well-off. 
Consider the case of California’s Accessory Dwelling Unit (ADU) policy. 
ADUs, or granny flats, are small independent housing units added to single-
family houses, either within the existing building envelope or alongside it.139 
They are the gentlest form of densification.140 In 1982, California passed a 
landmark law requiring local governments to permit ADUs.141 In 2002, seeing 
that the 1982 law did not do much, California passed another law, requiring 
ADUs to be approved on a “ministerial” rather than discretionary basis.142 What 
followed? Nothing.143 As Margaret Brinig and Nicollet Stelle Garnett showed 
in a terrific article, local governments around California were able to use their 
multiple powers to regulate land use to frustrate the building of any ADUs.144 
Cities like San Francisco and San Diego tried to pass the least accommodating 
ADU laws possible; Santa Cruz barred owners from renting out ADUs, making 
them less useful; and dozens of cities imposed lot size, parking or street frontage 
requirements that made ADUs infeasible.145 Over the past twenty years, the 
California legislature has been forced to pass a series of laws knocking down 
 
density on other lots. Under the Model Article, however, preemptive state laws that bar local 
governments from engaging in one type of land use restriction may fail the justification and 
tailoring requirements, as reducing one and only one type of restriction will often only have 
a marginal effect on housing prices.  
 137 See Margaret F. Brinig & Nicole Stelle Garnett, A Room of One’s Own? Accessory 
Dwelling Unit Reforms and Local Parochialism, 45 URB. LAW. 519, 544–45 (2013). 
 138 See Nisma Gabobe, California Looks to a Future Beyond Single-Detached House 
Zoning, SIGHTLINE INST. (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.sightline.org/2019/11/22/california-
looks-to-a-future-beyond-single-detached-house-zoning/ [https://perma.cc/ED8T-B2WZ] 
(explaining how localities enact extensive restrictions to limit statewide ADU policies and 
prevent homeowners from building). 
 139 See Brinig & Garnett, supra note 137, at 520.  
 140 See Patrick Sisson, Why Tiny ADUs May Be a Big Answer to the Urban Housing 
Crisis, CURBED (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.curbed.com/2018/1/16/16897014/adus-devel 
opment-us (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal). 
 141 See Brinig & Garnett, supra note 137, at 541.  
 142 Id. at 523, 541–42. Would this law have been a “general” law? Perhaps not, as it sets 
out standards for local governmental action, and not just general standards of conduct. The 
1982 law may not have passed muster either under the Model Article. 
 143 Id. at 520–24. 
 144 See id. 
 145 Id. at 547, 549–55. 
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local resistance to ADUs.146 Only after 2016 and 2017 reforms have we seen 
any real growth in ADU construction (and that was slow enough that the 
legislature needed to pass a new reform in 2019).147 
It is nothing short of remarkable that California has, over the course of the 
twenty-five years, passed, roughly speaking, the same law over and over again 
to overcome local resistance to ADUs.148 In the meantime, California’s housing 
shortage went from a local problem to a national crisis.149 This type of effort is 
effectively the only way states could preempt local zoning rules under the Model 
Article (and it’s not clear many of these ADU laws would have been 
constitutionally acceptable under the Model Article). 
The housing crisis is one of the biggest economic and social problems of 
our day.150 It is a local government law problem.151 And the Model Article 
would make efforts to solve it difficult or impossible. The authors of the Report 
might argue that allowing state override has not led to enough housing 
production. But there are some useful state interventions, and far more stories 
of that type than instances where we have seen local governments liberalizing 
land use policies on their own.152 Further, the Report proposes slanted versions 
of preemption in other contexts, and there would be nothing to stop it from 
suggesting a version that made efforts to stop local exclusion harder while 
protecting other local laws.153  
Also, exclusion is not merely about residential zoning. Commercial zoning 
can be about exclusion, jurisdictions too good for Dollar Stores or Wal-Marts 
keeping them and their low-priced goods away (and thus excluding the poor and 
middle-class shoppers).154 Policing can be about exclusion, as my colleague 
 
 146 See Gabobe, supra note 138. 
 147 See Josh Cohen, California ADU Applications Skyrocket After Regulatory Reform, 
NEXT CITY (Jan. 4, 2018), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/california-adu-applications-
skyrocket-after-regulatory-reform [https://perma.cc/9HM7-KSNC] (describing how 2016 
and 2017 laws actually led to construction of ADUs); Patrick Sisson, Will California’s New 
ADU Laws Create a Backyard Building Boom?, CURBED (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.curb 
ed.com/2019/10/11/20909545/adus-development-california-real-estate-housing-shortage 
(on file with the Ohio State Law Journal) [hereinafter Sisson, California’s New ADU Laws] 
(describing 2017 and 2019 laws). 
 148 See Brinig & Garnett, supra note 137, at 523–24, 541–42;  Sisson, California’s New 
ADU Laws, supra note 147. 
 149 See Patrick Sisson, Jeff Andrews, & Alex Bazeley, The Affordable Housing Crisis, 
Explained, CURBED (Mar. 2, 2020), https://archive.curbed.com/2019/5/15/18617763/ 
affordable-housing-policy-rent-real-estate-apartment (on file with the Ohio State Law 
Journal) . 
 150 See id. 
 151 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 15, 18. 
 152 See Cohen, supra note 147. 
 153 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 16–17. 
 154 See Steven Malanga, Unjust Deserts, CITY J. (Jan. 3, 2020), https://www.city-
journal.org/banning-dollar-stores [https://perma.cc/3W3B-38HT] (describing effects of bans 
on dollar stores and retail chains). 
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Monica Bell has shown.155 Garbage services can be about exclusion.156 There 
is nothing in the Model Article that limits local authority to exclude, and lots 
that make efforts to restrict that authority difficult.157  
Further, the Model Article invites greater local regulation of “private 
law[s].”158 Most states, in one way or another, keep cities away from areas like 
tort, contract, insurance, corporate and domestic relations law.159 Allowing 
cities to pass private laws is, in some contexts, very attractive. For instance, Rick 
Hills and I have argued that the fact that cities cannot regulate nuisance law 
directly leads them to bar housing from manufacturing zones rather than passing 
urban equivalents of “right to farm” laws.160  
But this proposal opens the floodgates. Even liberal versions of the private 
law exception—like New Mexico’s, which allowed local minimum wage 
laws—only allow local governments to pass private laws in situations when 
there are not excessive extraterritorial effects.161 Under the Model Article, there 
would be no limits, absent state laws that make it through the phalanx of the 
Model Article’s limits on preemption. There would thus be huge new 
opportunities for local governments to use new private law powers to exclude 
or to generally muck up the regional economy.  
The Report takes these arguments head on, at least, arguing that local 
regulatory variation is good.162 Now, local variation can be good. As the Report 
notes, it can create laboratories of democracy and—as the Report weirdly 
omits—allows for Tiebout sorting, people voting with their feet for one 
regulation or another.163 But local variation is hardly an unalloyed good. People 
regularly live in one town, shop in another and work in yet another, passing 
through many others en route.164 There are real harms to having different basic 
 
 155 Monica C. Bell, Anti-Segregation Policing, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 650, 659 (2020) 
(describing how police practices can generate segregation by making places uncomfortable 
for some and very comfortable for others). 
 156 See, e.g., Mount Prospect State Bank v. Vill. of Kirkland, 467 N.E.2d 1142, 1143 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (allowing local government to refuse to provide garbage services to 
mobile homes even though it provides the same service to single-family homes). 
 157 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 16–17, 29–30. 
 158 Id. at 40–41.  
 159 Id. at 24. 
 160 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, The Steep Costs of Using 
Noncumulative Zoning to Preserve Land for Urban Manufacturing, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 
257–60 (2010) (arguing that if manufacturing zones are needed, they should not bar all 
housing but instead include nuisance law reforms that mimic “right to farm” laws). 
 161 See New Mexicans for Free Enter. v. City of Santa Fe, 126 P.3d 1149, 1160–65 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 2005). 
 162 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 56–60. 
 163 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 
418–20 (1956) (presenting a classic argument about benefits of local control that was weirdly 
not mentioned in the Report).  
 164 See Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, supra note 70, at 1533–34 
(explaining how people choose a place to live based on what is accessible to them in the 
surrounding area, not just what is in their town of residence). 
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rules governing contracts and torts given the increasing regional orientation of 
our economies and lives.165 Further, in most metropolitan areas, there are lots 
and lots of local governments, and an unchecked authority to pass private laws 
would give them powerful tools to exclude or to reward local incumbents. The 
results will almost surely be less of a single-market in regions, creating huge 
compliance costs for individuals and firms. Further, even if local private laws 
fit local preferences, they will almost inevitably harm agglomeration economies 
at the metropolitan level.166  
B. Local Democracy 
The Model Article provides substantial protections for local authority over 
elections and local governmental form.167 You’d think from reading the Report 
that local elections provided extremely effective representation and valuable and 
fair opportunities of public participation.168  
But, dear reader, can you answer these questions? Do you know who 
represents you on your city council? What faction she sits with? What issues are 
currently before the County Board or Commission? What policies are the sheriff 
or the city treasurer actually responsible for?169  
Ignorance of local affairs is extremely commonplace, especially outside of 
small towns and for figures other than the mayor.170 If local elections are 
partisan, voters will regularly just vote for the same party they vote for 
President, regardless of what the local government is doing.171 If local elections 
are non-partisan, voters will cast about for whatever information they can get 
their hands on, often relying on wholly irrelevant characteristics.172 Even more 
commonly, people don’t vote at all, reflecting the low information and high 
 
 165 See id. 
 166 Cf. id. at 1511–15 (describing conflict between local control and regional economic 
growth). 
 167 PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 30, 62–66. 
 168 Id. at 62. 
 169 If not, don’t worry—you are not alone! Most of us can’t answer these types of 
questions! 
Voter ignorance is not a problem of a benighted ‘they,’ but rather is a problem for all 
of us who live in the real world with its competing demands; requirements that we feed 
ourselves, and the like. If you show me someone who has deeply and truly studied each 
choice they have to make when voting, I will show you someone who is not all that 
busy.  
David Schleicher, From Here All-The-Way-Down, or How to Write a Festschrift Piece, 48 
TULSA L. REV. 401, 415 n.112 (2013). 
 170 See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 21, at 365–70; David Schleicher, Why Is 
There No Partisan Competition in City Council Elections?: The Role of Election Law, 23 
J.L. & POL. 419, 419–27, 444–55 (2007) [hereinafter Schleicher, Partisan Competition]. 
 171 Schleicher, Partisan Competition, supra note 170, at 457. 
 172 See id. at 425, 466.  
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costs of participation.173 Turnout in local elections can be shockingly low, 
especially because local elections—sometimes at the behest of local 
governments themselves—are held off-cycle, driving down turnout and biasing 
it towards older, richer, and whiter residents.174 Off-cycle elections also help 
interest groups who are able to mobilize voters, like teachers’ unions in school 
board elections, even where those interests are not popular.175 More generally, 
local elections are—in Bill Fischel’s famous term—dominated by 
“homevoters,” homeowners who use local elections to choose officials to 
protect their property values, both by ensuring the quality of local public goods 
and by excluding anyone who might drive down average values.176  
Ignorance of elected officials is not unique to local politics. As I and others 
have argued, it is common in and explains state elections as well.177 But neither 
is local politics an exception, at least outside of small local governments.178 And 
it is getting worse. As local newspapers close and national media dominates, 
attention on local politics continues falling (with severe consequences for the 
quality of local governance).179 Political parties are more and more defined by 
their national, and not local, characteristics.180 
In this context, does it make sense to fully protect local electoral and 
governing rules from state override? You could make the argument that local 
politics is better because, as Fischel claims, homevoters have the right incentives 
to hawkeye government services, at least in local governments below a certain 
size.181 But if you did, you would have to respond to arguments that 
homeowners have incentives to exclude.182 Or you could, like Eric Oliver, 
suggest that sorting among local governments has meant that people inside these 
governments largely agree about what governments should do, making low 
turnout not a problem.183 But if you did, you would not include the other aspects 
 
 173 See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 21, at 386. 
 174 See Sarah F. Anzia, Election Timing and the Electoral Influence of Interest Groups, 
73 J. POL. 412, 412–13 (2011); Hajnal & Lewis, supra note 22, at 645–46, 655–57.  
 175 See SARAH F. ANZIA, TIMING AND TURNOUT: HOW OFF-CYCLE ELECTIONS FAVOR 
ORGANIZED GROUPS 128 (2014).  
 176 See FISCHEL, THE HOME-VOTER, supra note 35, at 1–18. 
 177 See DANIEL J. HOPKINS, THE INCREASINGLY UNITED STATES: HOW AND WHY 
AMERICAN POLITICAL BEHAVIOR NATIONALIZED 2 (2018) (explaining that state voting 
directly tracks national votin g); David Schleicher, Federalism and State Democracy, 95 
TEX. L. REV. 763, 764–68 (2017). 
 178 See Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 21, at 365. 
 179 See Vivien Lee & David Wessel, How Closures of Local Newspapers Increase Local 
Government Borrowing Costs, BROOKINGS INST. (July 16, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/ 
blog/up-front/2018/07/16/how-closures-of-local-newspaper-increase-local-government-
borrowing-costs/ [https://perma.cc/2QEK-UW82]. 
 180 See HOPKINS, supra note 177, at 1–2. 
 181 See FISCHEL, supra note 35, at 1. 
 182 Richard Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1824, 1836–37, 
1853 (2003) (book review) (criticizing Fischel for ignoring the problem of exclusion).  
 183 See generally J. ERIC OLIVER, DEMOCRACY IN SUBURBIA (2001). 
912 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:5 
of the Article, as introducing new powers would upset that balance. And again, 
the domain in which the argument makes sense is not the full set of local 
governments.184  
Instead of making either of these arguments, the Report simply ignores the 
problem, and talks about local democracy as if it were uncomplicatedly 
representative of local preferences.185 And the Report ignores the possibility of 
local faction or entrenchment. But local politics is famously home to a great deal 
of entrenchment, with local officials even using public policy to encourage the 
exit of groups that oppose them politically, or annexations to capture racially 
specific populations to influence voting.186  
Questions of representation have taken a central place in many discussions 
of local government in recent years. For one classic example, consider 
Ferguson, Missouri. In the local election before Michael Brown’s shooting, 11% 
of voters turned out.187 A majority of the electorate was white in a city that is 
67% African-American (and racially differential turnouts are not the rule—in 
Ferguson, voters of all races turned out at roughly the same rate in the previous 
Presidential election).188 Claims about the importance of local control are harder 
to make when local government does not really represent the preferences of 
local residents.189 
More broadly, the Black Lives Matter movement has turned national 
attention on how low-information local elections and politics can lead to interest 
group influence. Many analysts have pointed to the influence of police officers 
(and police officer unions) in local elections as a reason for a lack of oversight 
in cases of police abuse.190 The Black Lives Matter “Campaign Zero” platform 
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calls for all sorts of state laws intruding on local control, including most notably 
special state prosecutors to remove local control of prosecution of police 
brutality cases.191 
Now, maybe the possibility of state override would not improve these issues 
or make them worse. State politics is certainly subject to many of the same 
problems as local politics.192 Would greater local control over elections and 
governmental form lead to outcomes that are more representative of local 
preferences? Greater participation? To make this argument, the Report would 
have to engage with concerns about the quality of local democracy. But it does 
not.193  
Further, as the Model Article includes affirmative demands on the state 
legislature, there was nothing stopping it from including mandatory governance 
reforms in its suggestions for new constitutional rules. It could have suggested 
that state constitutions require anything from the use of neutral districting 
commissions to on-cycle local elections. It could have included requirements 
that local elections be governed by rules aimed at generating local party 
competition.194 This would not have relied on future decisions of the state 
legislature, but rather on the text it is proposing being inserted into state 
constitutions. But the Report’s obsession with preserving local power at all costs 
kept it from doing so.  
C. Local Fiscal Powers 
The Model Article offers a variety of reforms that would radically change 
the nature of local fiscal policy. The Model Article suggests removing any state 
constitutional limits on local taxing powers, freeing local governments to pass 
income taxes or corporate taxes unless expressly preempted by state law.195 It 
seemingly removes barriers to spending local money on non-public purposes, 
as it embraces the freedom of local governments to spend as they see fit.196 The 
Model Article also bans unfunded state mandates and limits the capacity of the 
state to tie conditions to state funds.197 Finally, it suggests extending state 
constitutional educational “adequacy” requirements to all services, although it 
 
 191 Independent Investigations and Prosecutions, CAMPAIGN ZERO, https://www.join 
campaignzero.org/investigations [https://perma.cc/8WGT-ZK83] (last updated May 28, 
2019). 
 192 See e.g., Tom Perkins, Revealed: Police Unions Spend Millions to Influence Policy 
in Biggest US Cities, GUARDIAN (June 23, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/ 
2020/jun/23/police-unions-spending-policy-reform-chicago-new-york-la [https://perma.cc/ 
32MF-X2QJ]. 
 193 PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 5. 
 194 For some radical electoral reforms, see Elmendorf & Schleicher, supra note 21, at 
409–11.  
 195 See PRINCIPLES, supra note 1, at 25, 42, 44. 
 196 Id. at 25. 
 197 Id. 
914 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 81:5 
provides almost no explanation (less than one page!) of what this requirement 
would actually mean.198  
Taken together, the Model Article would dramatically increase the budgets 
and powers of local governments and, unless voters were willing to pay much 
higher taxes in total, decrease the fiscal authority of states.199 Given such a 
radical change, one might expect some discussion of whether local governments 
are likely to be good stewards of those funds. To help calm the nerves of 
taxpayers, the Report might also have proposed perhaps some constraints on 
how local governments can use this huge influx of cash. But the Report offers 
nothing of the sort.  
The Report does not discuss the rampant problem of local pensions and 
other post-employment benefit (OPEB) underfunding.200 While many 
governments entered into this recession in decent enough shape, there are a 
substantial number of local and state governments that did not save enough to 
fund the benefits they have promised retired public workers.201 Underfunding 
pensions is a way around balanced budget rules, and local governments take 
advantage of this to provide benefits to workers today without having to pay for 
them.202 In some cases, local pension crises have been driven by economic 
decline, but there are also pension crises in fast growing places like Houston203 
and in big cities with lots of revenue sources like Chicago.204 There are thus 
strong reasons to worry that huge new revenue sources would not necessarily be 
used wisely.  
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The Model Article could have suggested guardrails on local budgeting 
governing pensions, but it does not.205 It could have suggested that the state 
constitution require that local governments budget in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles, as New York City is required to do,206 but it 
does not. These would be limitations on local power and the Report will accept 
no such restrictions.207  
Following the national contest to host Amazon’s “HQ2” and high-profile 
corporate moves, like General Electric’s decision to move to Boston, there has 
been a huge debate over whether to limit local subsidies to firms to locate their 
headquarters or offices.208 Similar debates occur over subsidies for sports 
stadia.209 Both types of subsidies are arguably inefficient globally, as they 
transfer funds to mobile firms and away from others, even if they are good for 
individual local governments.210 There are also reasons to believe that firm-
specific subsidies are not even good for the local governments that offer them, 
as local politicians favor their ability to get headlines for “saving” or “creating” 
jobs over the general economic benefits that come from lower taxes and high 
quality services.211 State constitutional amendments barring the use of public 
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funds for private purposes once played a role in limiting state and local 
subsidies, but courts have taken almost all of the teeth out of these clauses.212 
Both states and local governments offer subsidies to firms.213 However, 
there are reasons to be more worried about local subsidies. States (usually) do 
not offer subsidies to firms to move around inside a state.214 Thus their 
competition for firms is limited in some ways.215 In state legislatures today, 
there are a number of proposals that would limit state and local power to provide 
subsidies or tax exemptions to specific firms.216  
Whether or not a particular type of reform of public subsidies for firm 
location is a good idea is beyond the scope of this essay. But no such reform 
would work if a state adopted the Model Article. The central legal challenge 
facing efforts aimed at limiting local subsidies is that local governments can 
offer many different kinds of subsidies.217 Even if a state law successfully 
preempted direct local subsidies to individual firms, local governments could 
come up with other mechanisms for providing subsidies, from property tax 
exemptions for firms in a specific industry (that only happened to apply to one 
firm) or spending that had no other purpose than improving the location in which 
a firm had just brought property. Given the Model Article’s narrow-tailoring 
preemption rules,218 a state would face huge challenges in designing a 
mechanism for displacing local subsidies. Flush with new taxing authority and 
potentially increased state aid, one can bet that these subsidies would come 
flying if a state adopted the Model Article. 
The Report could argue that subsidies to Amazon or the Milwaukee Bucks 
are actually good. Or it could argue that the game of giving local governments 
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harmful competition. But the Report does not do any of these things. Instead, it 
just assumes local governmental power is always good.219  
Another example of the Model Article’s weird refusal to limit local 
governments in any way comes in the area of criminal fines and fees. The Report 
condemns local abuses of their powers to create criminal misdemeanors with 
financial penalties.220 “There are, however, legitimate concerns that allowing 
cities to create misdemeanors may ensnare uninformed persons, especially 
nonresidents passing through often-imperceptible municipal boundaries.”221 
Notably, the problem of fine and fee enforcement is a big problem for local 
governments specifically, as fines and fees provide a mechanism for local 
governments to get revenue from outsiders who are passing through rather than 
burdening their own taxpayers (people travel between states far less frequently). 
The Report also notes that power to create local criminal penalties often furthers 
“the baleful trend of over-criminalization of conduct that some states and the 
federal government have begun to attempt to reverse.”222  
But when push comes to shove, the Report cannot bring itself to suggest any 
limits on local authority, even where the Report itself acknowledges systematic 
local abuses: 
For maximum flexibility and logical consistency, this provision permits home-
rule governments the same extent of criminal lawmaking as the state. This 
language is included in the model Article, however, with awareness of the 
serious concerns regarding local criminal lawmaking, and policymakers should 
think carefully about the tradeoffs before enacting the proposed language.223 
The Model Article not only allows criminal fines and fees, it would remove 
restrictions on their use.224 The most prominent in the area of fines and fees has 
been Missouri’s rule that local governments may not rely on fine and fee 
revenue for more than 20% of local budgets.225 That provision would likely be 
barred by the preemption rules in the Model Article.  
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More broadly, the Report lacks any balance. It is like the reversal of the 
famous line in the first Spider-Man comic.226 In the Report, with great power 
comes… absolutely no responsibility or limits.  
One last note on the Report’s fiscal chapter: the Report notes that its 
adequacy provision is “perhaps the most innovative” idea.227 The one important 
positive right in American constitutional law is the right to a public education 
found in state constitutions.228 Over the last forty years or so, there have been 
several waves of litigation aimed at forcing states to equalize their funding for 
schools using either broad equal protection arguments or, more commonly, 
claims under state “adequacy” clauses in education clauses.229 These cases have 
broken in many different ways across the country, but have had huge effects in 
many places, leading to massive flows of money to poorer school districts (and 
to population flows to them as well).230 But in many states, legislatures have 
been unwilling or unable to fully comply with the demands set out by state 
courts, leading to decades of litigation and huge face-offs between courts and 
legislatures.231 Further, while the effect of these cases has been to move money 
from location to location, the standards courts have adopted have often been tied 
to educational standards and not only tax fairness.232  
As a result, the Report’s suggestion that the logic of educational adequacy 
requirements be expanded to all local services could mean many different 
things. The Report offers less than a full page of explanation and virtually no 
details, other than comparing it to educational adequacy cases generally and 
saying it should provide local governments with the capacity to provide a 
minimum level of services.233 Would it look like Texas’s approach or 
Kentucky’s?234 Or neither one? What standards would exist for determining 
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adequacy across multiple types of services? How would money be shared across 
overlapping local governments providing services in an area? 
 The failure to put any meat on the bones of this idea suggests the Report 
does not take it too seriously. I wish it had, as it is, as the Report says, the most 
innovative idea in the Report.235  
D. Incorporation, Annexation and Secession  
The failures of the Report are not only failures of commission, but also of 
omission. While the Report focuses on giving power to local governments, it 
almost entirely ignores to whom this power is given. It suggests that the full 
suite of powers it creates should be available to all home rule general-purpose 
local governments, but this category includes both very large entities to quite 
small ones.236 The Model Article offers no distinctions, suggesting that New 
York City with 8.6 million residents and a home rule city of ten thousand sitting 
in the suburbs or exurbs of a metropolitan area should have the same powers.237 
As it proposed a whole new constitutional Article, the Report could have 
included any sort of change the authors wanted. The report could have suggested 
changes in how local governments are formed, how they grow and under what 
circumstances they can split apart, but it did not.  
Here is the explanation it offers for ignoring question of incorporation, 
annexation and secession: 
Because the model provisions below primarily set forth a structure to balance 
state and local authority, they do not address boundary issues directly, although 
they do specify that the state must have home rule governments. As with 
charters, state constitutional reform could include modifying how a state 
approaches boundary questions, and nothing below is meant to suggest that 
there might not be a substantial interest in any given instance in scaling aspects 
of governance to the needs of a metropolitan region.238 
This is not much of an explanation; it just states that the Report decided to 
focus on one thing and not another. The Report notes that the 1950-era AMA 
report did make recommendations about governmental expansion.239 The 
authors of the Report chose not to make a similar recommendation. 
Further, the Model Article’s provisions would clearly influence questions 
of incorporation, annexation and secession, and would have very different 
effects depending on how many local governments there are in a given 
metropolitan area. But the Report provides no guidance or effort to fit its 
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proposals to the very different types of local governments we see around the 
country. 
It is impossible to understand the benefits and costs of many of the Model 
Article’s provisions without reference to which government will exercise them. 
For instance, giving a local government like Indianapolis’s Unigov (which is 
the merged government of Indianapolis and Marion County) power over private 
law would not result in varying types of contract law among residents of the 
inner-ring of a metropolitan area.240 By contrast, in the Boston area, it is often 
hard to tell if one is in Cambridge or Sommerville, Boston or Brookline, as the 
boundaries do not fit much of lived economic or social life.241 Giving each of 
these small local governments power over private law would create huge 
problems for determining what law governs transactions.242  
The same is true for other provisions. For instance, does it make sense to 
restrict state preemption of ordinances passed by big and small cities in the same 
way, given the differential likelihood of externalities? This is particularly a 
problem with the fiscal aspects of the Report. In places with small, exclusionary 
local governments (which is every place, although to varying degrees), giving 
local governments more taxing authority would reduce equality across places, 
unless one believes that residents will agree to bear higher taxes in total.243 
Further, the new taxing and regulatory powers the Model Article granted to 
cities would encourage new efforts at incorporation and secession.244 Perhaps 
the adequacy provision would address this to some degree, but given the paucity 
of explanation the Report offers, it is hard to be certain. Similarly, the costs of 
exclusion—which would be far worse under the Model Article—would be felt 
more dramatically in some places rather than others, given differing levels of 
housing demand and the number and type of local governments.245 
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Annexation and secession have been a major political football in recent 
years.246 Texas and North Carolina were traditionally states that allowed cities 
relatively free rein to annex land, but have cut back on these powers 
substantially.247 In places like Alabama, Georgia, and Louisiana, we have seen 
a number of efforts at secession from cities and school districts.248 But the 
Report takes a pass on commenting on it, even though, as Richard Briffault 
famously argued, the boundaries of local governments are likely more important 
to their fiscal and political capacities than their formal legal powers.249 
The Report could have tied its suggestions to particular governmental forms 
(suggesting that some provisions only apply to cities above certain size, for 
instance) or included principles to govern incorporation, annexation and 
secession. Doing so would have made the rest of the argument more compelling.  
V. CONCLUSION:  
THE FAILURE OF IMAGINATION IN THE NLC REPORT 
A casual reader of a high-profile proposal to change local governmental 
authority might assume that it would have something to say about the central 
challenges of local governance like the housing crisis, police brutality, 
segregation, or local pension problems. These issues are in the news. They have 
be the subject of tons and tons of scholarship, by local government scholars and 
others.  
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It would have taken hard and creative thinking to respond to these problems, 
rather than simply pushing back on abusively preemptive state laws. But the 
Report did not pursue a broader agenda and included many provisions that 
would create unintended consequences. This is a failure of imagination.  
I understand why it might have felt imperative to respond to provocations 
like “super preemption.” It stinks to see local governments adopt reasonable and 
just policies and then have state legislatures preempt them. In many cases—the 
fight over HB2 in North Carolina particularly—these preemption fights 
certainly made me extremely frustrated.250 
Some response to the rash of preemption and “super-preemption” laws 
might have been reasonable. But, as the kids say, “this ain’t it, chief.”251 There 
are other problems out there, and the proposed Model Article would make those 
problems worse. No state should adopt the NLC’s recommendation. 
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